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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERNAL STRATTON and 
NEOLA STRATTON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
WEST STATES CONSTRUCTION, 
1 U rah corpora ti on, and 
JACK LORDS, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
10841 
Plaintiffs do not concur in defendants' statement of 
facts. It omits significant details and states as fact matters 
which are not. 
Richard Lee, agent of Western States Wholesale 
Supply, a corporation doing business as Western States 
Construction, without instructions or limitations on his 
authority (R. 268), represented to the plaintiffs that 
their home in Cedar City had been selected for a very 
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special offer. He stated to the plaintiffs that he was not 
a mere agent but was the company and desired to use 
plaintiffs' home for a special advertising project; he 
promised certain improvements, including aluminum sid. 
ing, new windows, storm doors, and a roof, at a cost to 
plaintiffs of $2,650, and that as a further consideration 
to the plaintiffs for the advertising use to be made of 
this special project, the plaintiffs were to be paid $200 
for each subsequent job done by the company up to 26 
such jobs (referred to as units). The contract (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1) was signed by the plaintiffs and by Lee for 
the company. (R. 16-18, 23, 29, 296, 298) 
The contract provided that the plaintiffs could at 
their option pay off the entire amount at any time or 
pay monthly payments, the first such monthly payment 
not to be due until "60 days after completion of work." 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) 
Defendant Jack Lords and others working for him 
took photographs of the home before and during work. 
(R. 32, 206, 278, 279) 
The work was not done in a workmanlike manner, 
there being numerous defects. ( R. 33-48, 110) 
While the work was still in progress and despite 
the provisions of the contract that the plaintiffs' first 
payment was not due until 60 days after completion of 
the work, Lords went to Cedar City to get the plaintiffs 
to sign papers for third party financing. (R. 49, 274) 
There is evidence that at this time Lords repudiated that 
portion of the contract dealing with the $200 credit for 
each of the 26 job units. ( R. 49) Plaintiffs declined to 
sign the requested financing papers. (R. 204) Shortly 
thereafter and while the work was still uncompleted to 
his knowledge, Lords caused a mechanics lien for the 
full contract price to be recorded against the property. 
(R. 204, 205, 209, 279) Laborers and materialmen also 
filed liens. ( R. 284) There is evidence from which the 
jury could deduce that these other liens were also filed 
at the insistence of Lords. (R. 130) They are all on the 
same form, apparently the same typewriter, and all filed 
at the same time at the request of Lords' attorney. See, 
e.g., Defendants' Exhibits 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
Advised that the liens subjected them to possible 
attorneys fees and costs, plaintiffs on the advice of their 
then attorney, Robert L. Gardner, agreed to make pay-
ments which would remove the liens to avoid these po-
tentially large expenses. As part of this negotiation, Lords 
agreed to complete the improvements and to obtain re-
leases of the liens. Plaintiffs withheld $500 of the contract 
price pending such completion of the contract work. (R. 
8, 11, 77, 89,90, 178, 193, 198, 283) 
Although the liens were released, neither Lords nor 
anyone else ever appeared to finish the work called for 
by the contract. (R. 48, 87, 90, 100, 102, 115, 189, 193, 
206, 212) 
Plaintiffs ultimately brought suit to enforce the con-
tract. Defendants moved for summary judgments on the 
theory of an accord and satisfaction based on a letter sent 
by Robert L. Gardner to the defendants' attorney. At 
the hearing on the motion it developed that the letter 
was but one stage in a series of negotiations wherein the 
parties agreed on some things but not on others. Specifi-
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cally the plaintiffs would pay certain moneys to the de. 
fendants; the defendants would release the liens and 
would complete the work under the contract, the plain. 
tiffs holding $500 pending such completion. The question 
of the 26 job units under the contract was discussed but 
not resolved. Defendants never, however, completed per. 
formance under the contract or these subsequent negotia. 
tions. (See Supplemental Transcript of Summary Judg. 
ment Proceedings) The motion was denied; it was re-
newed at trial and again denied. 
At trial, defendant Lords admitted that there had 
been from 25 to 30 job units completed subsequent to 
the plaintiffs' contract. 
At the conclusion of a two day trial, the jury ren-
dered its unanimous verdict for the plaintiffs in the 
amount of $6,900 which sum was reduced $500 by the 
Court to compensate for the funds withheld earlier by 
the plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE WAS NEITHER AN ACCORD 
NOR A SATISFACTION. 
Defendants moved for summary judgment, and at 
trial, on the theory of an accord and satisfaction. They 
premised this on the letter sent by Gardner to Knowlton. 
(Def. Ex. 3) At this time the work had been only par-
tially completed, and in an unworkmanlike manner at 
that; Lords had repudiated certain parts of the contract; 
Lords had filed a lien for the full contract price even 
though the work was not finished ; and others had also 
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filed liens even though the work was not completed and 
the plaintiffs were not in default. 
At the hearing, Robert L. Gardner, attorney for the 
plaintiffs at the time pertinent, testified that certain 
money was held out pending completion of the work by 
the defendants. (Transcript of Summary Judgment Pro-
ceedings, p. 11, 12) He testified that Lords was to com-
plete the project. There were discussions about the $200 
per unit. Plaintiff Vernal Stratton testified that the prom-
ised \Vork was never completed. (Transcript of Summary 
J'Jdgment Proceedings, p. 16) 
It is obvious from the record that the defendants 
failed to prove an accord. There was not agreement con-
cerning the $200 per unit for 26 units portion of the 
contract. It is undenied that the plaintiffs withheld $500 
from the contract price pending completion of the con-
tract work by defendants, and it is equally undenied that 
the contract was never completed. This was the state of 
the e\·idence at the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment and at trial. 
Absent proof of a full settlement, intended as such, 
it would have been error for the jury to have found an 
accord, let alone a satisfaction. Owens v. Hunter, 91 Ariz. 
7, 368, P. 2d 753 ( 1962). 
It is elementary, hornbook law, requiring no lengthy 
citation of authorities that even had there been an accord, 
upon the failure of the defendants to perform thereunder, 
the plaintiffs would be entitled to pursue their remedies 
under the original contract. Whitney v. Richards, 17 
Utah 226, 53 Pac. 1122 ( 1898) ; Restatement of Con-
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tracts, §417; Williston on Contracts, § 1841 (Rev. ed. 
1938). 
Since there was no accord, and not even perform-
ance by the defendants of those acts which they did 
promise to do, and which they were already obligated 
to do, the trial court was correct in denying their motion 
for summary judgment. There is substantial competent 
evidence to support the verdict of the jury which rejected 
the accord and satisfaction theory also. 
POINT II. THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT 
AGAINST DEFENDANT JACK LORDS. 
This case was tried to a jury which brought in a 
unanimous verdict against defendants West States Con-
struction and Jack Lords. This was not error. There was 
ample, competent evidence to support the verdict. 
The jury could hardly avoid finding that Lords 
participated personally from the outset with full knowl-
edge of all the salient facts and as the prime mover in 
this unsavory affair. Richard Lee was sent out by Lords 
to get contracts, without, according to Lords either in-
structions or limitations. Lee represented that the house 
improvement transaction was to be used for selling other 
improvement contracts and that pictures would be taken 
for that purpose. (R. 24) Lords, himself, took some pic-
tures. 
Even though Lords knew full well that the contract 
provisions did not obligate plaintiffs to pay one cent until 
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60 days after completion of the work, Lords attempted 
to get the plaintiffs to agree to a third-party financing, 
and when he was unsuccessful, he personally undertook 
to place on the property mechanics' liens for the full con-
tract price even though the work had not been completed. 
There is evidence that he was instrumental in getting 
others to file liens. They were all done at the same time, 
apparently on the same typewriter and placed of record 
by Lords' attorney. There is evidence that at the time of 
the negotiations with Robert L. Gardner that Lords per-
sonaly ratified, adopted and assumed the obligations of 
the contract and undertook personally to see to their 
performance. ( R. 90, 91, 114, 115, 93, 198, 283) 
There is also competent evidence from which the 
jurv could conclude that Lords was party to an attempt 
to deprive the plaintiffs of their contract rights by use 
of a forged contract, omitting the $200 per unit for 26 
units provision. Compare Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 with Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit 29 and Defendants' Exhibit 20. The jury 
could well deduce personal participation in this portion 
of the transaction. The jury could find that Lords' per-
sonal participation, adoption and ratification of the con-
tract obligations, and personal, intentional, imposition of 
the mechanics' lien even before completion of the work, 
all tied him personally into what is less than a savory 
transaction. On the basis of these numerous personal 
involvements and the logical implications to be drawn 
therefrom, the jury could well find, and were justified 
in so doing that Lords was personally liable, the company 
front being a mere alter ego. 
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That he should eschew personal liability and prefer 
the shield of the corporate veil for nefarious business 
activities is understandable. The jury, however, on com-
petent evidence, determined otherwise. Being based on 
competent evidence, the verdict of the jury must stand, 
in accordance with 'veil established principles of law. 
Toomer\ Estate v. Union Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah 37, 239 
P. 2d 163 ( 1951); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 
P. 2d 273 (1952). 
POINT III. THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
Defendants assert that instruction number 5 is er-
roneous as far as defendant Jack Lords is concerned. 
This is not so. Defendant Lords and his corporate co-
defendant answered in the first instance by simply alleg-
ing the defense of a partially completed accord and satis-
faction. (Answer, pleading file p. 11) By an amended 
answer first filed at the date of the trial, both defendants 
re-alleged the defense of accord and satisfaction "be-
tween the parties" and estoppel. (Amended Answer, 
pleading file, p. 23) In neither the original answer nor 
the amended answer is there a specific, intelligible denial 
of Jack Lords' implication and relationship with the 
shoddy transaction sufficient to raise the position defend· 
ant Lords now takes on appeal. 
Since, in addition, there was competent evidence 
upon which the jury could impose liability on Lords, even 
if there be error in this instruction, it was nonprejudicial. 
A.s a matter of note, but not noted by defendants, 
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the trial court in its instruction number 5 repeated almost 
verbatim the only portion of the defendants' amended 
answer which could be any stretch of the imagination be 
construed as a denial of Lords' involvement and liability. 
This is the last sentence of instruction number 5 which 
is almost identical with the last sentence in the def end-
ants' amended answer prior to the prayer therein. 
Considering this careful patterning of the court's 
instruction to the defendants' amended answer it is diffi-
cult to envision the basis for defendants' complaint about 
their own theory and authorship. 
Defendants object to instruction number 14 which 
sets forth the law of private contractors bonds, alleging 
such instruction to be irrelevant, immaterial and preju-
dicial. They do not state how or why it might be pre-
judicial. 
Plaintiffs contend that in view of the defendants' 
wrongful and intentional placing of a mechanic's lien on 
the property and their implication in getting others to do 
likewise, the law relative to such liens and contractors 
bonds is highly pertinent. Defendants had not even com-
pleted their work when they caused the lien to be re-
corded. Surely the jury was entitled to know the effect 
of this bad faith action. Defendants merely assert that 
there was error in the instruction; they do not point out 
how it could have been error. It was not. 
Defendants further object to instruction number 17 
which provided for the imposition of a single sum as 
damages, asserting that it permitted the jury to assess 
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punitive damages against defendant Lords. Since the jury 
verdict was less than the amount of possible actual dam. 
ages, defendants were not prejudiced. However, even had 
the jury awarded punitive damages against defendant 
Lords there would have been no error considering that 
Lords was, undeniably in some instances, the prime mover 
in this deal and in other instances probably the prime 
mover - with full and calculating knowledge. 
Plaintiffs contend there was no error in the jury in· 
structions, and even were there error, in absence of proof 
of harm the verdict must be affirmed. Mace v. Tingey, 
106 Utah 420, 149 P. 2d 832 ( 1944); Hales v. Peterson, 
11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822 (1961). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, the plaintiffs respect· 
fully pray this Court to dismiss the appeal and to affirm 
the judgment rendered on the jury verdict below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. HARLAN BURNS 
95 North Main Street 
Cedar City, Utah 
Attorney for the 
Plaintitf s-Respondents 
